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• Politicization (De Wilde, 2007; Hutter & Grande, 2014): a process that 
results in public debate about an issue based on two aspects: 
1) salience is attached to specific issues (i.e. similar issues),  
2) (polarized) opinions are voiced 
• Party communication and party strategies – or how do parties 
contribute to politicization? 
 Two strategies parties can choose 
− Raising different issues/positions  adversarial strategy 
− Focusing on the same issues/positions  co-orientation strategy 
Issue: by focusing on the same issues  co-orientation strategy 
Opinion: by raising different positions  adversarial strategy 
 
 
 
Politicization and party strategies –  
research questions and hypotheses 
Politicization 
Applying politicization to Europe 
− for a long time Europe has been non-politicized… 
− … but might be triggered by Euroskeptic challengers 
 
 
 
 
 
 Euroskeptic parties might 
challenge pro-European 
parties by putting new 
issues and positions on 
the agenda to “upset the 
dominant party 
alignment”  
(Carmines & Stimson, 1993) 
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• How did Euroskeptic parties use European Parliament election…  
– ... to put forward their issues? 
– … to voice their critique on the European Union? 
 
• How did pro-European mainstream parties communicate in the 
context of a rising Euroskeptic challenge? 
– … with regard to issues?  
– … with regard to the critique on the European Union?  
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Politicization and party strategies –  
research questions 
Issue focus 
• H1a: Euroskeptic challenger parties focus their campaign on other EU-
issues than pro-European mainstream parties (adversarial strategy). 
• H1b: We expect this difference between Euroskeptic and pro-European 
parties to be less pronounced in EU-skeptic countries (co-orientation).  
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Politicization and party strategies –  
hypotheses 
Opinions  
• H2a: Euroskeptic challenger parties criticize Europe more often 
(salience) and more fundamentally (type) than pro-European 
mainstream parties (adversarial strategy). 
• H2b: We expect this difference between Euroskeptic and pro-European 
parties to be less pronounced in EU-skeptic countries. 
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Politicization and party strategies –  
hypotheses 
Case selection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Quantitative content analysis: 
of all press releases published by all parties (vote-share > 3%) twelve* 
weeks prior to the EP election (N=2513) 
 
Study design and methods 
EU-friendly 
EU-skeptic 
 EU-skepticism Euroskeptic parties 
  (among citizens)   
Germany  22% Linke, AfD 
Netherlands  28% SP, PvdD, CU-SGP, PVV 
Austria  33% FPÖ, BZÖ 
Portugal  35% CDU, BE, PCP 
UK  36% Conservative, UKIP, BNP 
Greece  48% KKE, SYRIZA, ANEL, XA, LAOS 
Source: Eurobarometer 81.2 2014, Chapel Hill Expert Survey.  
* for Portugal only data for 8 weeks are included in the analysis so far. 
Similarities vs. differences of pro-European and Euroskeptic parties 
• Issue focus 
− All issues are related to the EU  
− 17 aggregated categories (e.g. economy, territorial questions etc.) 
 Duncan Index of Dissimilarity (and Cramer‘s V 
 
• Opinions on Europe (Taggart, 1998; 2002) 
− Soft Euroskepticism: criticism of EU polity, EU politics and EU policies 
− Hard Euroskepticism: fundamental opposition to the idea of European 
integration as such 
 Frequency tables 
 
  
Study design and methods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Issues in the 2014 EPE campaigns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Issues in the 2014 EPE campaigns 
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Economy 21% 
Law and order 
8% 
Immigration 
6% 
International 
Affairs 16% 
Environment 
and Energy 
6% 
Citizens rights 
8% 
Elections 11% 
Other topic 
24% 
Germany Economy 
17% 
Social and 
labor market 
policy 7% 
Law and 
order 6% 
International 
Affairs 7% 
Environment 
and Energy 
7% 
Agriculture 
and Food 9% 
Citizens 
rights 9% 
Constitutiona
l questions 
and 
functioning 
of EU 7% 
Elections 
14% 
Other topic 
17% 
Netherlands 
Economy 15% 
Social and labor 
market policy 8% 
Law and order 5% 
International Affairs 
7% 
Environment and 
Energy 6% 
Citizens rights 6% 
Elections 26% 
Other topic 27% 
Austria N = 303 
N=958. 
N=183. 
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Economy 
29% 
Social and 
labor market 
policy 14% 
Agriculture 
and Food 5% 
Elections 42% 
Other topic 
10% 
Portugal 
Economy 9% 
Social and 
labor market 
policy 6% 
Immigration 
11% 
International 
Affairs 10% 
Environment 
and Energy 6% Constitutional 
questions/ 
functioning of 
EU 5% 
Territorial 
questions 26% 
Elections 12% 
Other topic 
15% 
UK 
Economy 29% 
Social and labor 
market policy 10% Elections 28% 
Other topic 33% 
Greece 
N=520. 
N=229. N=341 
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Comment: Cramer’s V in parenthesis,  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
 
Empirical findings 
Issue focus – aggregated main issues per Party in UK (%) 
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Comment: Cramer’s V in parenthesis,  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
 
Empirical findings 
Issue focus – aggregated main issues per Party in Greece (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Empirical findings – Issue focus (Hypothesis 1a and b) 
H1a: Euroskeptic challenger parties focus their campaign on other EU-issues than pro-
European mainstream parties (adversarial strategy). 
 mostly 
H1b: We expect this difference between Euroskeptic and pro-European parties to be less 
pronounced in EU-skeptic countries (co-orientation strategy).   
 reject 
 
 
Comment: Higher values indicate lower correspondence in issue agendas of Europhile and all/specific Euroskeptic parties. 
EU-
friendly 
EU-
skeptic 
Europhile vs. all 
Euroskeptic parties 
Europhile vs. specific Euroskeptic parties 
Duncan index (0-100) Duncan index of dissimilarity (0-100) 
All countries 39.4 
Germany 38.5 Linke: 36.2, AfD: 40.8 
Netherlands 63.1 SP: 47.6, PvdD: 63.6, CU-SGP: 61.0, PVV: 80.2 
Austria 27.9 FPÖ: 27.1, BZÖ: 28.7 
Portugal 29.4 CDU: 19.8, BE: 25.9., PCP: 42.7 
UK 43.8 Conservative: 56.8., UKIP: 36.4, BNP: 38.1 
Greece 33.4 KKE: 25.0, SYRIZA: 31.7, ANEL: 17.0, XA: 65.0, LAOS: 28.5 
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Empirical findings 
Opinions about Europe – Portugal in % 
N=341. 
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Empirical findings 
Opinions about Europe – UK in % 
N=229. 
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Empirical findings 
EU-Evaluations per country and party type (in %) 
N=2446. 
H2a: Euroskeptic challenger parties criticize Europe more often 
(salience) and more fundamentally (type) than pro-European 
mainstream parties (adversarial strategy). 
 Yes 
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Empirical findings 
Opinions about Europe (Hypothesis 2a) 
Euroskeptic parties Europhile parties 
Mean share of EU-critique (all) (%) 53 23 
Mean share of hard Euroskepticism (%) 10 1 
Mean share of soft Euroskepticism (%) 50 23 
N=2510. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Empirical findings 
Opinions about Europe (Hypothesis 2b) 
Difference between Euroskeptic and Europhile parties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H2b: We expect this difference between Euroskeptic and pro-European parties to be less 
pronounced in EU-skeptic countries. 
Reject 
EU-critique (all) 
Germany 41 
Netherlands 29 
Austria 35 
Portugal 9 
UK 37 
Greece 28 
EU-
friendly 
EU-
skeptic 
N=2510. 
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 Conclusions 
Issues 
− Euroskeptic parties tend to choose an adversarial strategy, i.e. focus on other EU-
issues than pro-European mainstream parties  
− “We often find “administration and bureaucracy“, “immigration“ or “constitutional 
questions“ among them 
− no systemtic differences between EU-friendly and EU-skeptic countries  
 
Opinions 
− Almost no hard criticism voiced (less than 5%, except UK) and only from 
Euroskeptic parties. 
− Again no systemtic differences between EU-friendly and EU-skeptic countries  
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Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Future studies 
• Impact of ideological proximity 
• Silencing strategy as a third alternative 
Politicization = issue co-orientation AND opinion polarization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion 
polarization 
Issue co-orientation 
politicization 
PT 
UK 
Rejecting/permissive consensus 
GR 
AT 
NL 
DE 
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Thank you very much for your attention! 
